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THE TRADE OF SECOND-HAND CLOTHES IN THE LOCAL 
MEGA CITY MWANZA, TANZANIA: WITH SPECIAL REFER-
ENCE TO THE SOCIAL NETWORKS OF MALI KAULI 
TRANSACTION
Sayaka OGAWA
Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University 
ABSTRACT  The purpose of this study is to examine the social relationships of people in a 
small-scale commercial sector called Machinga by analyzing the unique credit transaction in 
the trade of second-hand clothes in Mwanza city. The credit transaction described in this pre-
sentation is called Mali kauli and is conducted by middlemen and micro-scale retail traders. 
Previous studies of the urban informal sector argued that credit transactions tend to be con-
ducted by closed groups based on kinship and ethnicity. However, the Mali Kauli transaction 
is basically formed of purely business relationships and economic rationality rather than rela-
tionships originating in rural society. Mali Kauli transaction brings a lot of economic beneﬁts 
to both middlemen and retailers. On the other hand, this practice has potential for friction 
because it creates business transactions among people with unreliable relationships. In con-
clusion, I suggest that the newly-created urban group solidarities such as Machinga generated 
through Mali Kauli transaction to attain stable transaction, satisfy economic interest, and pro-
mote reciprocal help in urban areas.
Key Words: Urban social network; Group solidarity; Informal sector; Second hand clothes; 
Credit transaction.
INTRODUCTION
The economic liberalization in 1986 brought a rapid inﬂux of second-hand 
clothes to Tanzania. Second-hand clothes opened new economic opportunities 
and vitalized the small-scale commercial sector called Machinga. The numbers 
of Machinga are increasing at a tremendous rate. For example, Ngware (2000) 
reported that the numbers of Machinga in Dar es Salaam were estimated to be 
85,000 people in 1995.
The purpose of this study is to examine the social networks of the unique 
transaction called Mali Kauli, in the trade of second-hand clothes in Mwanza. 
The Mali Kauli transaction discussed in this paper is a unique credit transaction 
conducted by middlemen and small-scale retailers. This transaction brings a lot of 
economic beneﬁts to both kinds of merchants. However, this transaction is sustained 
not only by economic beneﬁts but also by the urban solidarity of being of the same 
social group as Machinga. Despite their economic priority and their roles as patrons, 
the middlemen try to build “horizontal and personal relationships” with the retailers.
The numerous studies of urban social networks of the informal sector focus on 
the ethnic networks or rural community memberships in the city. They insist that the 
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urban informal sector tends to be made up of closed groups of relatives, people of 
the same origin and ethnic groups, and that these group memberships give reciprocal 
help in their urban livelihood and in doing business cooperatively. On the other 
hand, some studies point out that the successful informal sectors tend to fall into 
a dilemma between maintaining relationships with relatives and rural community 
members, those who ask the successful informal sector for economic assistance, and 
modern economic rationality. And many successful informal sectors cannot achieve 
effective capital investment and expansion of their business because they cannot 
reject requests for assistance (Marris & Somerset, 1971; Binefeld, 1975; Hart, 1975). 
Some studies argued that the successful informal sector should abandon “affection” 
of these group memberships and create modern business relationships if they wish to 
expand their business (Hyden, 1983).
However, previous studies paid little attention to the creativity of the informal 
sector. The social networks discussed in this study are new urban social networks 
created through interaction in economic activities to satisfy both economic needs 
and “affection”. The middlemen and retailers begin the Mali Kauli transaction with 
purely business interest and their own economic rationality, aimed at maximizing 
economic benefit. Through the same economic activity, they also create new 
urban solidarity. In this paper, I will make clear how the traders conduct economic 
activities to satisfy both proﬁts and “affection” by creating new urban solidarity.
I conducted research through participant observation for about 10 months from 
September 2001 to June 2002 in Mwanza city, the provincial capital near Lake 
Victoria in western Tanzania (Fig. 1). 
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THE TRADE OF SECOND-HAND CLOTHES IN MWANZA
I. The Merchants of Second-Hand Clothes in Mwanza
The merchants who entered the trade of second-hand clothes in Mwanza can 
be categorized into three: wholesalers, middlemen and retailers. The second-
hand clothes inflow by these traders is shown in Fig. 2. Wholesalers are defined 
as those who import the bales from international recycle agencies and sell them 
to middlemen. The second-hand clothes are gathered from general households by 
charity organizations and volunteer associations and then transferred to recycle 
agencies. Recycle agencies classify the second-hand clothes by the kinds of item and 
wrap these items in vinyl sheeting and iron bands. The blocks of clothes wrapped 
with vinyl sheeting are called bales (Table 1). Wholesalers import these bales and 
sell them to middlemen in their shops.
Middlemen are defined as those who purchase bales from wholesalers and sell 
them item by item to retailers. In Unguja area, there is Mlango Mmoja permanent 
market, where 350 stalls of second-hand clothes are established. Most middlemen 
open the bales and resell them to retailers in this market.
Fig. 2. The Flow of Second-Hand Clothes in Mawanza


























Fig.2 The flows of second hand clothes in Mawanza
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Retailers are deﬁned as those who purchase the second-hand clothes from 
middlemen and sell them to consumers. Retailers can be sub-classiﬁed into 
stall-keepers, small-street traders, vendors and rural market traders. 
In Mwanza, there are 18 wholesale shops. The managers and the employees 
of these shops are estimated to be about 30 persons. Middlemen are estimated to 
be about 200 persons and retailers are estimated to be about 6,000 people. Most 
wholesalers are Indian traders while other trades are dominated by Africans.
Table 1. The Kinds of Bales and Price of a Bale
The kinds of clothes 
(English)
The kinds of clothes 
(Swahili Language)
Pagination Price of bale(Ths.)
Men’s shirt Shati ya kiume 200 100.000-120.000
Men’s cola T-shirt T-shati ya kiume 200 90.000-110.000
Men’s round T-shirt T-shati raundi 200 70.000-
Men’s zipper jacket Jaketi 100-120 65.000-
Coat/Suit jacket Coati 60 45.000-
Men’s cotton trousers Kadeti suruwari 100 80.000-
Men’s woolen trousers Kitambaa suruwari 100 85.000-
Men’s jeans Jinzi suruwari 100 80.000-105.000
Men’s corduroy pants Corudorai suruwari 100 80.000-
Men’s slacks Kurimpurin suruwari 150-200 55.000-60.000
Ladies cotton blouse Kadeti brauzi 250-300 45.000-55.000
Ladies mixed blouse Mixser brauzi 300-350 45.000-55.000
Ladies silk blouse Siruki brauzi 300-350 45.000-55.000
Ladies cotton skirts Kadeti sketi 120-200 40.000-
Ladies silk skirts Siruki sketi 150-200 150.000-
Ladies cotton dress Kadeti gauni 150-180 65.000-
Ladies mixed dress Mixser gauni 100-300 55.000-
Swimming clothes Suwimingu 350 55.000-
Trunks/Track suit Bukta 250 50.000-
Spats Sukintaito 250-300 50.000-
Short pants Pensi mkubwa 180 55.000-
Nightdress Night dress 800 65.000-
Brassiere Brazia 1000 180.000-
Mixed children clothes Mixser watoto 350-400 75.000-
Children’s bomber jacket Jaketi watoto 300 65.000-
Boy’s jeans Jinzi watoto 80-100 55.000-
Boy’s short pants Pensi watoto 350-400 85.000-
Socks Soksi 1000 Variable
Bedsheet Shuka 300 Variable
Curtain Pazia 500 Variable
Handbag Mikoba yakike 200 Variable
Baggage Mikoba 150 Variable
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II. The Process of Mali Kauli Transaction
There are two types of transactions between middlemen and retailers: cash 
transaction and Mali kauli transaction (a kind of credit transaction). About 80% of 
middlemen interviewed in my research conducted Mali kauli transaction. According 
to this result, Mali kauli transaction can be regarded as the main transaction between 
middlemen and retailers. In Mali kauli transaction, a middleman deals with an 
average of 20 retailers. A middleman sells clothes to retailers on credit without 
collateral, and allows them to return the unsold clothes, and renegotiate the “basic 
price.”
The Mali kauli transaction is accomplished as described below. Most middlemen 
purchase an average of 7 bales from wholesalers twice a week. On the morning 
of the 1st day, a middleman opens his bales and classiﬁes the second-hand clothes 
into three grades (A, B and C), according to the quality and fashion of each item. 
In this case, grade C is not sold but saved until the 3rd day. After the middleman 
ﬁnishes the classiﬁcation, retailers inform the middleman of their grade of choice. 
Then, the middleman determines the “choosing turn” of the retailers requesting the 
same grade. Retailers choose their clothes according to their “ choosing turn”. For 
example, the ﬁrst retailer of grade A chooses 50 clothes, then the second retailer of 
grade A chooses 30 clothes, and then the third retailer follows him, followed by the 
fourth, ﬁfth and so on. Finally, the middleman and each retailer negotiate the “basic 
price” per item.
During the daytime of the 1st day, the retailers start selling the clothes. They try 
to earn their share by selling each item above the “basic price”. On the evening of 
the 1st day, the retailers would return to the middlemen with the money obtained 
from the sale. At this time, the retailers can return unsold clothes or renegotiate the 
“ basic price”. Usually the middlemen would reduce the “basic price.” On the 2nd 
and 3rd days, the middlemen and the retailers repeat these processes.
Most middlemen purchase the bales on Mondays and Thursdays. Fig. 3 shows 
the cycle of selling the bales purchased on Monday. From Monday to Wednesday, 
the middlemen mobilize all retail traders of grade A and B to sell as many clothes as 
possible by decreasing the basic price of each item. Usually, the middlemen obtain 
Mon. Tue. Wed. Thu. Fri. Sat. Sun.
Grade A 1500 1300 1000
1300 1200 800
Grade B 1000 800 600
800 600
Grade C 500 500 500 500 400
250 250 250 250 250 250 100
Fig. 3. Example of Change of Purchase Price (Tsh; US$1 = Tsh 9.74)
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enough proﬁt to purchase bales until Thursday. And then, they mix the unsold items 
of grade A and B with clothes of grade C, which were saved from Monday. In other 
words, all of the unsold clothes become grade C on Wednesday. 
 On Thursday, grade C are sent to some rural markets. The rural market traders go to 
do business with the goal of selling everything. They will sell everything grade C at 
greatly reduced price to the small traders in the rural markets.
THE SOCIAL NETWORKS OF MALI KAULI TRANSACTION
I. How Mali Kauli Transaction Is Initiated
Usually, a Mali Kauli transaction is initiated by a request for assistance by 
a retailer, who claims to have no capital. When retailers propose Mali Kauli 
transaction to middlemen, they insist that the middlemen ("the rich") should 
assist retailers ("the poor"). And they also insist that both the middlemen and 
the retailers are fellow Machinga, who should help each other. Machinga can 
be deﬁned as street traders. From these remarks, it can be said that Mali Kauli 
transaction is created on claims of assistance from the retailers.
Of course, the retailers propose Mali Kauli transaction to the middlemen 
because it has many beneﬁts to the retailers. First, they can begin business 
without any initial capital. Some retailers used to have some capital at the 
beginning of their business, but most retailers cannot save their capital. Mali 
kauli transaction provides economic opportunities to those retailers without 
capital. This is why urban dwellers easily become merchants of second-
hand clothes. Second, they can return unsold clothes that failed to match the 
consumers’ preferences. They can’t choose good clothes all the time; sometimes 
they may be given clothes with stains. If they buy clothes for cash, they have 
to spend many days selling those clothes. However, in Mali kauli transaction, 
they can shift their business risks to the middlemen. Third, they can renegotiate 
the “basic price” on the following day if the original price was too high. These 
beneﬁts allow retailers to minimize their business risks and conduct stable 
economic activities. Then, why do the middlemen accept the retailers' Mali 
kauli transaction proposals? In fact, the middlemen do not respond to every 
request.
II. The Social Relationships between Middlemen and Retailers
A total 207 cases of such relationships between middlemen and retailers 
have been studied. Previous studies argued that credit relationships are often 
built based on closed groups consisting of relatives and people coming from 
the same districts or same ethnic groups (Epstein, 1958, 1981; O’Conner, 1983; 
Macharia, 1997). This is because close group memberships enable people to 
give reciprocal help in the city. However, in the case of Mali Kauli transaction, 
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new relationships created in the city through economic activities account for 
80% of the relationships. Thus, it is clear that the middlemen do not select the 
retailers for their social attributes.
The middlemen’s criterion for selecting retailers is the bargaining technique 
of the retail business called Ujanja. The middlemen deem retailers who are 
Ujanja appropriate to Mali Kauli transaction because they can sell many 
clothes by using their high bargaining technique. Ujanja is deﬁned in a Swahili 
dictionary as “cunning” “slyness.” But in practical usage, it seems to have 
various meanings. For example, the retailers stated, “Ujanja is the only skill 
for us to survive urban life because we don’t have any educational background, 
skills or capital”. The middlemen regard the retailer’s “cunning” as an 
indispensable skill for negotiating with the consumers in the retail business. In 
short, the middlemen select the retailers for their own economic reasons.
It is shown that the middlemen also consider at least two business 
advantages when beginning Mali Kauli transaction. First, they can attract many 
excellent retailers, including those who are without capital, and mobilize them 
to distribute the clothes rapidly and effectively. The middlemen are aware of 
the fact that there are very few retail traders who have enough capital to buy 
clothes for cash in Tanzania. Second, they can effectively allocate items of 
various grades among the retailers in exchange for credit. The second point 
becomes clear by contrast with a cash transaction, where retailers are free to 
select the grade they want and some grades remain unsold.
So far, we have seen that a Mali Kauli transaction brings a lot of economic 
beneﬁts to both middlemen and retailers. However, Mali Kauli transaction 
also has a potential for friction between the middlemen and the retailers, 
because Mali Kauli transaction is based on unreliable urban relationships. The 
background to sustaining Mali Kauli transaction in spite of such friction cannot 
be explained only by economic beneﬁt. Therefore, I will analyze how potential 
friction is caused and how newly urban group solidarity is created through Mali 
Kauli transaction. 
THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SAME SOCIAL GROUPS AS MACHINGA
I. The Potential Friction of Mali Kauli Transaction
Table 2 shows an example of business ability by a retailer who is considered 
to be Ujanja. Sometimes some retailers change the retail prices. It should be 
noted since retailers sometimes sell clothes below the “basic price,” like No. 9 
and No. 11. If the retailers sell clothes below the “basic price,” they have to 
pay the pre-established price to the middlemen. This means that the retailers 
sell the clothes for the middlemen even if they cannot get any proﬁt. Retailers 
No. 3 and No. 7 sold clothes on credit. In Mwanza, many customers don’ t 
have enough money to buy clothes. Thus, if retailers cannot sell clothes on 
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credit, they can’t sell many clothes. However, customers often delay or avoid 
paying the credit. Therefore, the retailers who can judge whether customers are 
reliable persons for credit are regarded as Ujanja retailers. In sum, the Ujanja 
retailers can be regarded as those who can sell many clothes for the middlemen 
by considering the balance between proﬁt and risk to themselves and proﬁt of 
the middlemen. It is very important that retailers recognize that they help to 
promote the middlemen’s business by selling many clothes. 
On the other hand, the middlemen also recognize that they assist the retailers 
through the Mali Kauli transaction. Fig. 4 shows the income of a retailer 
per day. This retailer needs at least Tsh 1,580 per day to make a living. If 
this ﬁgure is regarded as the minimum cost of living, this trader could not 
get enough proﬁt from his retail business on 26 days. However, on these 26 
days, this trader was given ﬁnancial support by the middleman for 19 days. 
Furthermore this trader got into debt to the middleman on the other days. This 
trader could sustain a minimum level of living on all the days. He was given a 
ﬁnancial reward by the middleman on those days he sold many clothes.
We have seen that both retailers and middlemen recognize that they help 
their partner. However, both may experience some friction as well. The 
middleman strives to achieve maximum proﬁt by harnessing the ability of 
Ujanja retailers. Therefore, they tend to allocate the bad clothes to Ujanja 
retailers at a high price by delaying their “choosing turn” until the very last. 
The middleman considers that Ujanja retailers can sell any clothes by using 
their high bargaining technique. They are expected to accept bad clothes 
because the middleman assists them adequately. However, Ujanja retailers wish 
Table 2. Examples of the Ability of Business of a Retailer
Client Purchase price Retail price Net proﬁt Credit
1 Panel beater 1500 1800 300
2 Indian merchants 1500 2500 1000
3 Banker 1500 2500 1000 500
4 General dealer 1500 1800 300
5 Gee man for bus 1500 1800 300
6 Small trader of candy 1500 1500 0
7 Arab 1500 2000 500 500
8 Owner of pharmacy 1500 2000 500
9 Vendor of foods 1500 1300 -200
10 Male passenger 1500 1800 300
11 Bus passenger 1500 1300 -200
Result of the business on 22/12/2001
(US$1 = Tsh 9.74)
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to purchase good clothes at a cheaper price at an earlier “choosing turn” so 
that they could sell many clothes for themselves rather than for the middleman. 
When the Ujanja retailers heap blame on the middleman, they would try 
to resist by sabotage, making excessive claims for ﬁnancial support, and 
running away with clothes. These kinds of resistance bring heavy losses to the 
middlemen. The frequency of running away is very high. For example, 11 out 
of 19 retailers transacting with a middleman ran away with clothes during my 
research. However the middlemen don’t take measures against these kinds of 
resistance. Nor do they form alliances with other middlemen to avoid defaulting 
retailers. Furthermore, they cannot punish retailers because this would agitate 
other retailers to take similar measures. This suggests that the retailers have 
bargaining power. Although the middlemen have economic priorities and the 
role of patronage, the relationship between them and the retail traders is not a 
hierarchical one; rather a horizontal relationship.
II. The Newly Created Urban Solidarity
When viewed in the light of potential frictions, Mali Kauli transaction 
sounds an unstable transaction. However, what is interesting is that almost all 
the retailers who ran away came back and restarted transactions with the same 
middleman. Thus, their resistance may be regarded as a temporary bargaining 
strategy. Why do the retailers come back? Certainly, part of the reason is that 
Mali Kauli transaction brings many beneﬁts to them. However, if retailers act 
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only for their economic beneﬁt, it is not necessary to come back to the same 
middleman because they can request other middlemen to start a new transaction. 
Why do the middlemen forgive the retailers who defaulted? It is reported that 
the middlemen and retailers have a sense of fellowship as Machinga and they 
create new urban group solidarity through the Mali Kauli transaction. Both the 
middlemen and the retailers call each other Machinga and other urban dwellers 
also call them so. Machinga is deﬁned as street traders. The term “Machinga” 
also includes the nuance of people who conduct disreputable business. In fact, 
they are exposed to the cold looks and harassment of the police. Although 
they are categorized as relatively rich middlemen and poor retailers, they have 
a sense of fellowship that they belong to the same social group to survive in 
the city. Based on this sense of fellowship, they create a new urban solidarity 
through the Mali Kauli transaction. 
In the police roundup of Machinga on March 2002, many middlemen were 
arrested by the police because they were operating in unauthorized places. 
At that time, the retailers who avoided arrest created a group of transaction 
members. Some 16 out of 20 transacting with the same middleman helped 
their partners by raising funds for the bribe paid to the police. Furthermore, 4 
retailers who did not pay for the bribe explained that they did not have enough 
money to pay because they had failed to do business at that time. None of the 
retailers chose to abandon their partners, rather they tried to help them.
CONCLUSION
Mali Kauli transaction brings many mutual beneﬁts to the middlemen and 
the retailers. Through the Mali Kauli transaction, the middlemen form an 
extensive commercial network by taking many urban poor into the trade and 
create an effective system to distribute imported second-hand clothes. And this 
enables poor retailers to conduct a stable business and survive in the city. The 
basis for sustaining the unstable Mali Kauli transaction may be explained in 
relation to the new urban group solidarity of Machinga is generated. So, part 
of the social network of Mali Kauli transaction is created by the consciousness 
of being in the same social groups as Machinga. Part of the social network of 
Mali Kauli transaction is the sense of belonging to the Machinga social group 
or the formation of which is based on the principle of reciprocal help.
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